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This paper explores the possibility that states respond asymmetrically to increases versus
decreases in their neighboring states’ welfare benefit levels. We present a theoretical model suggesting
that states respond more to decreases than to increases in their neighbors’ benefit levels. To test this
proposition empirically, we use a panel of annual state-level data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the
contiguous United States and the District of Columbia, and we observe changes in state demographic and
economic characteristics as well as changes in state welfare benefits. We find substantial empirical
evidence that uniformly supports our argument. State responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be
at least twice as large as their responses to neighbor benefit increases. Our empirical results are robust to
modeling neighbor benefits as endogenous. Our results, therefore, have substantial implications for
public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare
reforms of 1996.Asymmetric Policy Interaction among Subnational Governments:
Do States Play Welfare Games?
This paper presents a theoretical model suggesting that states respond asymmetrically to
increases versus decreases in their neighboring states’ welfare benefit levels. To test this proposition
empirically, we use a panel of annual state-level data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous
United States and the District of Columbia, and we observe changes in state demographic and economic
characteristics as well as changes in state welfare benefits. We find empirical evidence that uniformly
supports our argument. Our empirical results are robust to modeling neighbor benefits as endogenous,
using an approach similar to that employed by Besley and Case (1995). Our results, therefore, have
substantial implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy
associated with the welfare reforms of 1996.
Few current public policy issues have received the attention that has been focused on the
decentralization of welfare benefit-setting. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, passed with bipartisan support, considerably increased individual states’
autonomy in supervising their own welfare programs. Specifically, the new law replaced the federally
managed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a system of block grants to
states. Although states now have considerably more flexibility to devise their own welfare programs than
they did under the previous law, further decentralized benefit-setting may exacerbate an
interjurisdictional externality. That is, the new law increases the possibility, at least in theory, that states
will be affected by their neighbors’ welfare benefit policies. We are by no means the first authors to
make this argument. For instance, researchers such as Stigler (1957), Gramlich (1987), and Brown and
Oates (1987) have suggested that decentralized welfare benefit-setting could lead to a “race to the
bottom.”2
Brueckner (1996) and Brueckner and Saavedra (1997) explore policy interdependence at the local level.
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These papers also impose symmetry restrictions.
How do states respond to their neighbors’ policies? Several interesting recent papers address the
issue of state policy interdependence. Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993), for instance, find empirical
evidence that state fiscal policies are interdependent. Besley and Case (1995) also show that a state’s tax
changes are significantly correlated with those of the state’s neighbors. The existing evidence on state
welfare policy interdependence is much less conclusive. While Gramlich and Laren (1984) find evidence
of a positive correlation between own-state and neighbor-state benefits, Shroder (1995), estimating a
structural model and reviewing a different time period, uncovers little evidence to suggest that states set
welfare benefit policies interdependently. Ribar and Wilhelm (1994), in the only paper to our knowledge
to empirically treat states’ benefit levels as simultaneously determined, find mixed evidence concerning
the interrelationship of states’ benefit levels.
Every paper in the empirical literature on state policy interdependence, be it related to welfare
benefit-setting or a host of other policies, has effectively imposed the restriction that governments
respond symmetrically to each others’ policy changes.  That is, prior authors have forced a state’s
1
response to increases in a neighbor’s welfare benefit (or fiscal policy changes) to be symmetric to the
state’s response to decreases in a neighbor’s welfare benefit (or fiscal policy change) of the same
magnitude. This, however, may not characterize a state’s responses to others’ policy changes. We present
a theoretical argument suggesting that states should systematically respond differently to increases
versus decreases in their neighbors’ welfare benefits. In particular, we show that under a relatively
innocuous set of assumptions, states match their neighbors’ benefit decreases more closely than they
follow their neighbors’ benefit increases. While our illustration pertains explicitly to welfare benefit-
setting, a similar type of argument could be made for many other types of policies, such as the setting of
tax rates, industrial investment incentives, or other expenditure policies.3
We find substantial empirical evidence that states indeed respond to changes in neighbor benefits
in this manner. Using state welfare benefit data from the late 1980s and early 1990s, and modeling state
welfare benefit decisions as simultaneous, we show that while states do not appear to follow each other’s
welfare benefit increases, they do seem to respond to each other’s benefit decreases. We also theorize
that this asymmetric response becomes greater as the expected costs of potential welfare migrants
increase. This proposition is also supported in the data, to the extent that racial dissimilarity is a
reasonable proxy for perceived differences in costs of providing welfare. States appear to respond more
to states with racial composition less similar to their own, all else being equal. Since the new welfare law
allows even more state independence in setting benefit levels, we expect our results to be strengthened
by the new policy regime.
1. A MODEL OF INTERSTATE COMPETITION IN WELFARE BENEFIT-SETTING
This section provides a theoretical foundation upon which our empirical results can be
interpreted. We begin by presenting an abstract framework for analyzing welfare gaming between
multiple states. We then use this framework to argue that it is exceedingly unlikely for states consistently
to behave symmetrically in response to the potential increases and decreases in the welfare benefits
offered by a competitor. Moreover, one may well expect benefit decreases to induce a more pronounced
impact than would benefit increases of a comparable magnitude.
The set of all state governments, the strategic players of the game, is represented by the set
N={1,...,n}. Each state begins the game with an initial welfare benefit level. The profile of initial benefit
levels of each respective state is denoted by the vector (b) ￿￿  . The state’s strategic choice variable ii ￿ N+
N
is ￿ , the degree to which state i chooses to modify its benefits. States are free to set their final benefits at i
any non-negative level, implying that state i’s set of feasible strategies is represented by [-b , +￿). Each i4
Of course, worker mobility and migration can be formally modeled by introducing elements of worker
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productivity and preferences for state residence into our model. However, the introduction of such complexity does
not alter the central insight that benefit increases and decreases cannot be expected to have a symmetric impact on
competing states.
Note that this specification implicitly assumes that initial benefits and recipient population are in a
3
“migrational equilibrium” in the sense that recipient populations will change only if there is a change in the benefits
offered.
The social welfare function we consider should be thought of as accounting for changes in the benefits
4
received by those dependent on aid, as well as changes in productivity which result from changes in the size of the
work force. This detail can formally be captured by introducing labor markets similar to that considered in Wildasin
(1991). As noted in footnote 2, these additional elements of realism are superfluous in the sense that they in no way
alter our central conclusion regarding the asymmetry of benefit-setting behavior.
state i￿N is also endowed with an initial population of welfare recipients denoted by R . The final i
population of welfare recipients is determined by this initial population, mobility between workforce and
welfare populations, and migration between states. For convenience, we simply assume that the latter
two factors are linear in (￿)  .  To be precise, for each i￿N we assume there exists ￿>0 such that the ii ￿ N i
2
“creation” of new welfare recipients out of the state’s own work force is represented by ￿￿ . Migration ii
is modeled by assuming that for each j￿i there exists a positive constant µ =µ  such that migration from ij ji
state i to state j is given by µ (￿-￿), migration being into state i if this term is positive and out of state i i jij
if it is negative. The final total of state i welfare recipients is thus given by R + ￿￿ + ￿ µ( ￿ - ￿). ii i j ￿ ii j i j
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Now consider the incentives that states face when modifying their benefit levels. As in Brown
and Oates (1987) or Gramlich (1987), we assume that each state effectively views its own benefits as a
public good. Let W:￿ ￿￿  characterize the social welfare induced by publicly provided benefits. We i+ +
assume that W is concave and that W￿(0)>0, i.e., W is initially increasing. ii i
4
State benefits also impose costs on society. For simplicity, we initially assume that these costs
can be decomposed into two additive components. The first component involves direct expenditure costs,
the product of per capita benefits and the number of recipients. The second cost component represents
indirect costs attributable to welfare recipients, which we assume are characterized by an increasing5
convex function C :￿ ￿￿ . Such costs may, for instance, be due to increased expenditures on public i+ +
r
health care, education, or other public programs as a consequence of increased welfare population.
In the welfare benefits game we have just constructed, states simultaneously modify their
benefits seeking to maximize net welfare. Formally, the net welfare of state i is defined by W(b+￿) - ii i
(b+￿)(R+￿￿ + ￿  µ• ( ￿- ￿)) - C (R+￿￿ +￿  µ• ( ￿- ￿)), where the second component is the direct ii ii i j ￿ ii j i j i i i i j ￿ ii j i j
r
expenditure cost of welfare spending and the third component reflects the indirect costs attributable to
welfare recipients. A profile of strategies (￿*)  is an equilibrium if no state can unilaterally choose an ii ￿ N
alternative strategy to increase its net welfare.
We are particularly interested in determining how equilibria respond to symmetric disturbances
in this interactive environment. To clarify the comparison sought, we offer the following formal
definition.
DEFINITION: Let ￿ be a welfare game that is initially in equilibrium, i.e., ￿=0 for all i
i￿N constitutes an equilibrium. Suppose a perturbation of ￿ affects only the preferences
of states in J￿N. We shall say that there has been a positive shock to J if ￿*>0 for all j￿J j
and we shall say that there has been a negative shock to J if ￿*<0 for all j￿J; where j
(￿*)  denotes the post-shock equilibrium. Positive and negative shocks to J are said to ii ￿ N
be symmetric if ￿ =￿  for all j￿J; where (￿ )  is the positive shock equilibrium and jj i i ￿ N
+- +
(-￿ )  is the negative shock equilibrium. ii ￿ N
-
Note that this definition does not measure shocks by the impact on primitives such as state
preferences. Instead, a shock is classified as either positive or negative on the basis of whether
equilibrium benefits have increased or decreased. Consequently, the observed magnitude of a shock
depends on the physical change in primitives as well as the anticipated reactions of all states in the
system. Note also that symmetric shocks need not have been caused by perturbations of the same
magnitude. An advantage of defining shocks in this manner is that empirically we only observe the
change in a state’s benefit level, which reflects not only the initial perturbation but also the equilibrium
responses to other states, rather than ever directly the exogenous perturbation itself.6
PROPOSITION 1: Symmetric positive and negative shocks to J￿N will necessarily have
a symmetric impact on benefits offered by each state i￿J if and only if the social welfare
and indirect cost functions of each state i￿J are quadratic (that is, have constant second
derivatives) throughout the range of feasible equilibria.
Proposition 1, which we prove in the Appendix, reveals that only an exceedingly narrow class of
welfare games will induce symmetric behavior as a response to symmetric shocks. Indeed, the class of
“quadratic” welfare games described above is negligible within the space of all possible welfare games.
Consequently, one would generally expect asymmetric responses to symmetric shocks to be the rule.
Although we have asserted that asymmetry will typically prevail, this conclusion does not
specify which direction, if any, the asymmetry will be biased. Later in this paper, we shall address this
question empirically. For now, we consider it reasonable to expect that negative shocks will be followed
more closely by neighboring states than will positive shocks. Recall that each state’s social welfare
function embodies both concern for the quality of life of welfare recipients and concern for lost
productivity when citizens are lured out of the work force by attractive benefit levels. Recall also that we
are attempting to model the decisions made by those in charge of setting these benefit levels. Decreases
in state productivity levels and increases in unemployment levels are likely to be factors that such agents
are particularly concerned about. Consequently, it seems plausible to assume that over the observable
range of benefits, marginal social welfare is itself concave, i.e., marginal social welfare decreases at an
increasing rate. Similarly, it is easy to imagine that increasing masses of benefit recipients become
increasingly a marginal “political liability” due to indirect costs such as increased expenditures on health
care, education, etc. Thus marginal indirect costs may very well be expected to be convex, i.e., marginal
indirect costs increase at an increasing rate. These two assumptions, concavity of marginal social welfare
and convexity of marginal indirect costs, allow us to “sign” the asymmetry, as proven in the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 2: A negative shock to J￿N has a larger impact on benefits offered by
each state i￿J than does a symmetric positive shock whenever W￿ is concave and C ￿ is ii
r
convex for all i￿N.7
As a concrete example of such an environment, consider the following. Let us assume that social
welfare for a particular state i is in actuality a function of state benefits and aggregate production. To be
precise, suppose that W(B,Y)=￿BY; where B=b+￿, Y represents aggregate production, and ￿>0, and
subscripts are omitted for convenience. Thus social welfare characterizes simple Cobb-Douglas
preferences defined over benefits to the poor and aggregate production. Aggregate productivity is, of
course, a function of labor employment. Let us suppose that Y=L-￿L  when the L-most productive
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workers are employed; where ￿ is less than the reciprocal of twice the state’s entire population so that Y
is strictly increasing throughout the feasible range of potential employment levels, i.e., ￿<1/2P where P
is the largest possible work force. Lastly, we shall assume that the least productive workers are the first
to leave the work force and seek welfare benefits, implying L=P-￿B. Social welfare can thus be
expressed in a reduced form as W(B)=W(B,Y(B))=￿B[(P-￿B)-￿(P-￿B) ]. As the reader may readily
2
check, this reduced form of social welfare is initially increasing and concave, and its first derivative is
concave as well. Regarding indirect costs, suppose that indirect costs per capita can be expressed by
Ac(T)=µ+￿T ; where T is the total recipient population, and µ, ￿>0. We suppose that ￿ is “small” so that
r2
average costs are approximately constant throughout the feasible range of possible recipients. It follows
that C(T)=µT+￿T . Again, it is easy to check that indirect costs are increasing and convex, and that
r3
marginal indirect costs are also convex. It follows that social welfare and indirect costs as modeled
satisfy all necessary conditions required for Proposition 2.
We now extend our basic model to note that the costs associated with new welfare migrants may
differ depending on their state of origin. For instance, an influx of migrants with ethnic backgrounds
foreign to the host state may create a need for social services that would not otherwise exist.
Alternatively, one could imagine states having greater uncertainty about the costs that will be induced by
a population of migrants significantly distinct from the host-state population. Obviously a variety of
plausible explanations for this effect can be offered. To capture such effects, we assume that for each j￿i8
The condition that C (x)=0 for all x￿0 ensures that we are indeed considering just costs affiliated with an
5m
ij
inflow of out-of-state migrants.
there exists a convex function C :￿￿￿  such that C (M ) represents the migration costs associated ij + ij ij
mm
with a migration of M  welfare recipients from state j into state i. We further assume that C ￿(x)￿0 for ij ij
m
all x￿R, C (x)=0 for all x￿0, and the migration of welfare recipients is represented by M  = µ (￿ - ￿). ij ij ij i j
m 5
The introduction of these state-specific effects does not affect the central conclusions of
Propositions 1 and 2. It does, however, yield a new conclusion that applies to the relative impact of
benefit shocks with regard to the costs attributable to state-specific migration. Specifically, the following
proposition is proven in the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 3: A negative shock to J￿N has a larger impact on benefits offered by
each state i￿J the larger are the state-specific marginal migration costs that states J
impose on i.
The expected costs from migration may vary depending on the relative differences between the
characteristics of the low-income populations of states i and j. One possible difference across states
involves differential racial and ethnic low-income populations. A state with a low-income minority
fraction of 40 percent likely has more information about the potential costs of welfare migration from a
neighbor state with a low-income minority fraction of 30 percent, as opposed to the case in which the
neighbor state has a low-income minority fraction of 10 percent. Proposition 3 concludes that a state
would follow the neighbor state’s benefit decrease more closely in the latter setting than in the former.
Walker (1994) finds very little evidence for the existence of welfare-benefit–induced migration
from state to state. It is important to note, however, that our theoretical results do not actually require the
presence of welfare-induced migration. Nor do they require migration, when it occurs, to impose varying
costs depending on the state of origin. All that is required is that policymakers behave as if these features
were present. This is not to say that a lack of observed migration cannot itself be the result of strategic9
One can also think of the phenomenon of Tiebout competition, in which “foot voting” need not be
6
observed for its potential presence to have an effect on local government decision-making.
reaction explicitly designed to mitigate migration.  Instead, our point is that when modeling this behavior
6
one must recognize that public policy is often founded on the “reality” of public opinion as much as, if
not more than, on economic fact.
Our model generates two testable implications. First, we expect that states will respond
asymmetrically to other states’ benefit decreases versus other states’ benefit increases. Failure to
empirically model this asymmetry (when directed in Proposition 2) could lead to downward-biased (in
absolute value) estimates of responses to other states’ benefit decreases and upward-biased estimates of
responses to other states’ benefit increases, though signing this asymmetry is not necessary for this
insight to hold. Our second testable implication is that the asymmetry in responses to other states’
increases and decreases should increase with the expected migration costs from the state changing its
benefits. Since we do not have information on state government expectations of migration costs from
other states, we use differences in population characteristics (specifically, the fraction of the low-income
population that is black or Hispanic) between states as proxies for differences in a state’s appraisal of the
variance of possible costs associated with migration from different states. If we assume that ethnic
dissimilarity is indeed a proxy for costs of welfare migration, then a second testable implication of our
model is that the asymmetry in responses to other states’ increases and decreases should increase with
the absolute difference between the two states’ fractions of the low-income populations that are black or
Hispanic.10
All dollar values are adjusted to be in constant dollars using the consumer price index.
7
We have also estimated models in which the dependent variable is solely the AFDC benefit, and in each
8
case have obtained similar results to those reported herein.
We describe how we derive neighbor weights later in this section.
9
2. DO STATES RESPOND ASYMMETRICALLY TO NEIGHBOR BENEFIT CHANGES?
Our theoretical model suggests that states are unlikely to respond symmetrically to their
neighbors’ increases versus decreases in welfare benefit levels. This insight has significant implications
for empirical studies of interdependence of states’ policy choices. If states respond more to neighbors’
benefit decreases than to benefit increases, for instance, then a researcher who models responses as
symmetric will systematically understate the magnitude of the response to a neighbor’s benefit decrease
while systematically overstating the response to a neighbor’s benefit increase.
We are interested in estimating the relationship between changes in real own-state welfare
benefits and changes in real neighbor welfare benefits,  in which we treat neighbor benefits as
7
endogenous. Our dependent variable is the change in the real (1982 dollars) combined maximum AFDC
and food stamp benefits for a family of three in a state,  and our explanatory variable of interest is the
8
weighted sum of changes in neighbors’ maximum AFDC and food stamp benefits for a family of three.
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We express all variables in differences because our theoretical model describes predictions regarding
changes in welfare benefits rather than the benefit levels themselves. The pertinent data are published in
the Green Book, Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means, for each relevant year. In a handful of cases, these data were clearly miscoded in
the Green Book; in the analysis that follows we omit seven suspicious observations from the analysis.
However, it turns out that the choice of including or excluding these observations does not fundamentally






One important task in determining the relationship between a state’s benefit level and that of its
neighbors involves defining a state’s neighbors. Our empirical approach requires us to take a stand on
how states weight each others’ decision-making when devising their own policies. While there are
countless possible ways of identifying which states are neighbors, we propose two admittedly arbitrary
measures of “neighborhood.” The first relies strictly on proximity and size of other states. In this
measure, states are weighted on two dimensions: (1) the road mile distance between the state’s border
and the closest of the neighbor state’s three largest cities; and (2) the population of the neighbor state.
Holding neighbor population constant, the closer a large city in a neighbor state is to the state’s border,
the greater weight that neighbor state is assigned. Holding interstate distances constant, the larger the
neighbor state is, the greater its weight. Hence, in our first weighting scheme, state i assigns to each
neighbor state j a weight of
where p is state j’s population and d  is the road mileage between state i’s border and the closest of the ji j
three largest cities in state j. State i gives itself a weight of zero, and (obviously) all states’ weights sum
to one. Note that this weighting scheme does not require contiguity, as is required by Gramlich and Laren
(1984) and Ribar and Wilhelm (1994), and it assigns different weights among contiguous states based on
population differences and relative differences in distance.
Our second alternative measure of neighborhood has nothing to do with proximity, but is instead
based on state-to-state migration flows from 1985 to 1990, using U.S. Census data. In this scheme, state i
assigns each neighbor state j a weight of12
Shroder (1995) also uses a migration-based neighbor-weighting scheme.
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To illustrate our concerns with using net migration flows as our basis for this weighting scheme, doing so
11
would lead us to conclude, for instance, that Oregon weights Vermont higher than it does California when
determining its policies.
Our results from the migration-based model are similar if we do not constrain the sum of neighbor
12
weights to equal one.
These results are similar if we use the proximity-based neighborhood measure instead of the migration-
13
based neighborhood measure.
where res is the number of 1990 residents of state i who resided in state j in 1985.  We choose one-way j
10
migration inflows, rather than two-way net migration flows, to avoid the possibility of negative neighbor
weights as well as to avoid assigning equal weights to states with virtually no migration flows in either
direction and to states with large but offsetting population flows in both directions.  We use total
11
population migration rather than low-income migration to mitigate the potential endogeneity of the
weighting scheme. We adopt the two alternative weighting schemes because neither one is perfect: state-
to-state migration flows might be endogenous, and geographic proximity might be too restrictive a basis
on which to weight. Since both weighting schemes (as well as a purely contiguity-based measure, as used
in Ribar and Wilhelm, 1994) turn out to yield comparable results, our fears that results might be driven
solely by idiosyncracies of our definition of neighborhood are moderated.
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Before formally estimating the relationship between states’ benefit levels, we first provide
suggestive evidence that states respond asymmetrically to their neighbors’ increases versus decreases in
benefit levels. To initially gauge the degree of this asymmetric response, we present in Table 1 the mean
state responses to neighbor increases and neighbor decreases, using the migration-based measure of
neighborhood.  Row 1 of Table 1 presents these means for the entire sample. We observe that the mean
13
response to neighbor benefit increases is $2.34, while the mean response to neighbor decreases is $7.86.
This difference is not simply due to the fact that states have generally been decreasing their benefits over
the time period; the mean response to a neighbor benefit decrease (as a fraction of the mean neighborTABLE 1
Changes in State Welfare Benefits When Neighboring States Change Their Benefits
Dependent Variable: Real Monthly Combined AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits
(1) Mean Increase in (2) Mean Decrease in (4) Percentage Difference
Benefits When Neighbors Benefits When Neighbors (3) Difference between between (2) and (1)
Increase Theirs (Fraction Decrease Theirs (Fraction (2) and (1). (Standard in the State Benefit
of Neighbor Change of Neighbor Change Error of Difference Change as a Fraction
in Parentheses) in Parentheses) in Parentheses) of Neighbor Change
Full sample $2.335 $7.856 $5.521 34%
(67%) (90%) (1.088)
Neighbor change by >$10 per month 4.174 11.322  7.148 155%
(33%) (84%) (2.202)
Neighbor change by >$5 and <$10
per month 3.607  8.328 4.721 79%
(56%) (100%) (1.948)
Neighbor change by <$5 per month 1.979 0.692 -1.287 -50%
(80%) (40%) (1.724)
Note: Calculated using migration-based measure of neighborhood described in text.14
decrease) is 34 percent larger than the mean response to a neighbor increase. The difference between
these two responses is statistically significant at conventional levels.
If this difference is a mere artifact of the data, one might expect that the relative response to
decreases rather than increases would be similar when the neighbor benefit change is “negligible” versus
when the neighbor change is “large.” Specifically, one would expect states to have similar relative
responses to small neighbor benefit changes, such as $2 per month, say, as to larger neighbor changes,
such as $15 per month. In this spirit, we subdivide the set of absolute neighbor benefit changes into three
categories: less than $5 per month, between $5 and $10 per month, and over $10 per month. We find
suggestive evidence indicating that the gap increases as the absolute magnitude of the neighbor benefit
change increases. For instance, no statistically significant difference is seen between responses to small
neighbor benefit increases and small neighbor benefit decreases, and in fact, the mean response to small
neighbor increases is slightly larger than the mean response to small neighbor decreases. But for larger
changes, the response is considerably different. The mean response to a neighbor benefit decrease of
more than $10 per month (expressed as a fraction of the mean neighbor benefit decrease) is 155 percent
larger (and significantly different at conventional levels) than the mean response to a neighbor benefit
increase of the same magnitude. Hence, the results presented in Table 1 provide initial suggestive
evidence that states respond asymmetrically to their neighbors’ benefit changes.
Evidence of Simultaneous Asymmetric Benefit-Setting
Although the evidence presented above is compelling, it is not fully convincing, since we do not
model neighbor benefit-setting as simultaneous, and our results may merely be reflecting a tendency for
neighboring states’ benefit levels to trend down together. Hence, we now explore more formally the
degree to which states respond asymmetrically to neighbor benefit increases versus decreases. As we are
interested primarily in gauging the degree to which states respond asymmetrically to each other, we15
Gramlich and Laren (1984) and Shroder (1995) model the recipiency ratio as endogenous; indeed,
14
Shroder imposes the restriction that neighbor benefits affect a state’s benefits only through the recipiency ratio.
Later in this paper we model both the recipiency ratio and neighbor benefits as endogenous, as well as model the
recipiency ratio as endogenous and neighbor benefits as exogenous, as has been done in prior studies. The results
are qualitatively similar across model specification.
In non-election years, we take the average Republican vote shares from the two nearest elections.
15
We obtained our control variable data from the 1990 Census, the Survey of Current Business (August
16
1987, 1992 and 1995), the Green Book (see text), the Social Security Administration’s Social Security Bulletin
(various years), the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’s
publication Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment. Specific data citations are available on request from the
authors.
Shroder (1995) also uses these variables to explain differences in the state’s recipiency ratio.
17
adopt the set of control variables used in prior empirical papers on the topic of welfare policy
interdependence. Specifically, we control for changes in the ratio of families on AFDC to those not on
AFDC (the “recipiency ratio”),  changes in the Republican share of votes in congressional elections
14 15
(we also looked at the “conservativeness” of voting behavior by the state’s congressional contingent, as
captured by Americans for Democratic Action voting scores, which led to no real difference in the
results), changes in real per capita state disposable income, changes in the state’s federally set AFDC
funds matching rate, changes in the state’s percentage of AFDC recipients who are white, changes in the
state’s percentage of AFDC recipients who are unmarried, changes in the state’s female unemployment
rate, changes in the state’s ratio of females to employed males, and changes in the state’s average weekly
wages in variety stores.  The last three variables are intended to represent characteristics of the female
16
and low-skill labor market.  Our results are robust to changes in this control variable set. Specifically,
17
our results hold up qualitatively regardless of the set of control variables employed.
In order to treat states’ benefit policy determination as potentially interdependent, we must
model state benefit-setting as simultaneous. To do so, we model neighbor benefit changes as endogenous
with a two-stage instrumental-variables approach similar to that used by Besley and Case (1995) to
capture simultaneity of tax policy across states. Since we propose theoretically that changes in benefit16
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994) use similar variables to instrument for neighbor benefit levels.
18
levels occur because of a change in one state’s (or a set of states’) primitives, we seek instruments that
are likely to reflect these types of changes. We instrument for neighbor benefit levels using changes in
the neighbor states’ female unemployment rate, changes in the neighbor states’ ratio of females to
employed males, and changes in the neighbor states’ average weekly wages in variety stores.  All three
18
variables satisfy two criteria: from Wald tests, we find that each has significant independent power in
explaining variation in neighbor benefit levels, but in overidentification tests we fail in each case to
reject the null of instrument exogeneity. In addition, using a Hausman Lagrange multiplier test of the
joint exogeneity of the three instruments, we also fail to reject the null of instrument exogeneity. That is,
at least in a statistical sense, the relationship between our instruments and own-state benefits comes
solely through changes in neighbor states’ benefit levels.
At first, it may seem strange that these variables are appropriate instruments for neighbor benefit
levels. For instance, they measure a state’s labor market characteristics that are likely to be correlated
within a region. However, since we include these variables for both the home state and the neighbor
states in the first stages of our model, our instrumental variables reflect differences between home state
and neighbor state measures of these labor market characteristics. In this respect, it therefore makes
sense that our instruments are significantly related to neighbor benefits but, in models with home state
variables in them, not to home state benefits.
We use annual state-level benefit data from 1983 through 1994. The federal AFDC regime
changed substantially with the Family Support Act of 1988, which could have confounding effects on an
analysis of this sort. However, it turns out that our results are qualitatively similar (and statistical
significance is comparable) before and after 1988, although the magnitudes of the effects are somewhat
larger after 1988 than before the regime shift. We considered including a full set of time effects in17
The standard errors are virtually identical whether or not we correct for heteroskedasticity.
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addition to the set of state-specific time trends and time-varying covariates, but eventually opted against
this since the time effects would likely pick up a considerable amount of states’ strategic interaction, if it
exists. While we show that our results are constant across policy regime shifts, such as the Family
Support Act of 1988, and later in this section present evidence suggesting that our results are not merely
picking up national patterns in welfare benefit-setting, we are sensitive to the possibility that we are not
adequately capturing some common shock or policy shift in our current specification.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients on neighbor benefits generated from each weighting
specification described above. Each column represents a different neighbor definition. Row A of Table 2
presents the results of simple univariate regressions of changes in a state’s benefits on changes in
neighbor benefits. To provide a baseline for comparison, Columns 1 and 5 of Table 2 provide the
correlation between neighbor benefit changes and a state’s benefit change when the response is
constrained to be symmetric. When we model responses to increases versus decreases as symmetric, the
simple correlations suggest that a state changes its benefit level by 79 cents for every dollar change in
neighbor benefits (if defined using the migration-based measure) or 55 cents for every dollar change in
neighbor benefits (if defined using the proximity-based measure).  Contrast these results with those
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when we allow responses to neighbor increases and decreases to be different. While the estimated
response to a neighbor decrease is $1.02 for a dollar change in neighbor benefits (87 cents in the
proximity-based measure of neighborhood), the estimated response to a neighbor increase is just 17 cents
(14 cents with the proximity-based measure). The differences between responses to neighbor increases
and responses to neighbor decreases are statistically significant at any traditional level. Hence, the initial
parametric findings suggest that failure to differentially treat neighbor increases versus decreases leads to
an overstatement of responses to neighbor benefit increases and an understatement of responses toTABLE 2
Differences in Estimated State Responses to One Dollar Increases and Decreases in Neighbor Welfare Benefits
Dependent Variable: Change in State’s Welfare Benefit for Family of Three (532 observations)
Model Migration-Based Migration-Based Migration-Based value): Migration- Proximity-Based Proximity-Based Proximity-Based value): Proximity-
Specification Measure Measure Measure Based Measure Measure Measure Measure Based Measure
(1) (4) (5)
Estimated Difference Estimated (8)
Symmetric Between Symmetric Difference Between
Response to (2) (3) Responses to Response to (6) (7) Responses to
Neighbor Benefit Response to Response to Decrease vs. Neighbor Benefit Response to Response to Decrease vs.
Change: Benefit Increase: Benefit Decrease: Increase (and P- Change: Benefit Increase: Benefit Decrease: Increase (and P-
(A) OLS  0.793  0.170  1.015 0.845  0.545  0.140  0.867 0.727
regression: no (0.057) (0.208) (0.091) (p=0.002) (0.049) (0.098) (0.083) (p=0.000)
covariates included p=0.000 p=0.412 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.154 p=0.000
in estimation
(B) OLS regression:  0.714  0.132  0.921 0.789  0.437  0.033  0.774 0.741
includes covariates (0.067) (0.219) (0.100) (p=0.006) (0.053) (0.099) (0.087) (p=0.000)
mentioned in text p=0.000 p=0.547 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.740 p=0.000
(C) IV estimation:  1.363 -0.775  1.559 2.334  0.701 -0.474  1.418 1.892
neighbor benefits (0.354) (0.977) (0.346) (p=0.020) (0.303) (0.619) (0.449) (p=0.029)
are endogenous p=0.000 p=0.428 p=0.000 p=0.021 p=0.443 p=0.002
(D) IV estimation:  0.766  0.379  0.884 0.505  0.449  0.048  0.781 0.733
recipiency ratio is (0.075) (0.279) (0.105) (p=0.087) (0.056) (0.101) (0.089) (p=0.000)
endogenous p=0.000 p=0.176 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.638 p=0.000
(E) IV estimation:  1.452 -0.262  1.575 1.837  0.879 -0.255  1.365  1.620
both are (0.365) (0.239) (0.349) (p=0.080) (0.426) (0.823) (0.511) (p=0.091)
endogenous p=0.000 p=0.876 p=0.000 p=0.040 p=0.757 p=0.008
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses beneath estimated effects. Covariates and instruments are as described in the text.19
neighbor benefit decreases. The estimated effects of neighbor benefits are only slightly different when
the other covariates described above are included (but all right-hand-side variables still treated as
exogenous); we estimate that a state changes its benefit level by 71 cents for every dollar change in
neighbor benefits (if defined using the migration-based measure) or 44 cents for every dollar change in
neighbor benefits (if defined using the proximity-based measure) when constraining responses to
neighbors to be symmetric, and the differential estimated responses to neighbor benefit decreases versus
increases are of a similar magnitude to those reported in row 1 of the table.
Row C of Table 2 reports the estimated relationship between own-state and neighbor-state
benefits when neighbor benefits are treated as endogenous. We observe that the estimated constrained
relationship between the two (and the estimated gap between responses to neighbor decreases versus
increases) is about double the magnitude found when not modeling the simultaneity between state benefit
level-setting. While the differential effects are less precisely estimated than in the ordinary least squares
(OLS) case, they remain statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, it appears that the
differential response to neighbor increases versus decreases is understated if neighbor benefit changes
are treated as exogenous.
We also report the results of specifications in which we treat neighbor benefits as exogenous, but
rather treat the recipiency ratio as endogenous, in a specification closer to that used by Gramlich and
Laren (1984) and Shroder (1995), although unlike Shroder we still allow neighbor benefits to have a
direct effect on own-state benefits. Alternatively, we report the results of specifications in which both the
recipiency ratio and neighbor benefits are endogenous. The results are comparable to those reported
above. No matter which specification we estimate, one theme remains constant: In no case is the
estimated response to an increase in neighbor benefits statistically significant at traditional levels, while
in every case the estimated response to a decrease in neighbor benefits is statistically significant at the 1
percent level. Therefore, we can conclude that there are substantial apparent differences in a state’s20
We note, however, that real combined benefits increased from year to year in 34 percent of the
20
observations.
responses to its neighbors’ benefit levels, depending on whether neighbors increase or decrease their real
benefits. That is, we can empirically corroborate the theoretical implications put forth in Propositions 1
and 2 above.
Neglect as an Alternative Hypothesis
In any given year, the modal change in nominal AFDC benefits is zero, though nominal food
stamp benefits have increased somewhat for most states from year to year.  Since we deflate benefits by
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the consumer price index, we consider a nominal zero change in benefits as a real decline in benefits. As
such, a chance remains that our results do not really reflect strategic interaction among the states but
rather reflect a “neglect hypothesis.” Specifically, our results could conceivably be generated if most
states simply change their nominal benefits occasionally, and increase their nominal benefits
independently. In this case, we would observe little relation between neighboring states’ increases in
benefits, but most states would appear to be moving in lock-step to each others’ benefit declines. Of
course, this “neglect hypothesis,” if true, could very well be a manifestation of strategic behavior, in
which states, cognizant of their neighbors’ actions, strategically elect not to change their nominal
benefits when their neighbors do not change their nominal benefits. Hence, simply not raising benefits
and letting real benefits atrophy is consistent with a strategic welfare benefit-setting equilibrium.
However, the fact that we cannot with certainty distinguish strategic behavior from nonstrategic neglect
is somewhat unsatisfying. We note, however, that the findings presented in Table 1 (that the difference
between responses to increases versus decreases is apparently present in response to larger neighbor
benefit changes but not smaller neighbor benefit changes) make the “neglect” story less plausible as an
explanation for our findings.21
There are, however, other ways to determine the degree to which our results are merely picking
up a general pattern of failure to change nominal benefits, rather than strategic behavior. Specifically, if
our results are merely picking up a general pattern of benefit neglect, it would not really matter how we
define neighborhood—we should observe the same types of effects as we report above. To explore this
possibility, we construct two new types of neighborhood definitions, one based on the relative position of
states in alphabetical order and another in which neighborhood is determined using a random number
generator. If we find results similar to those reported above when we carry out these types of exercises, it
is less likely that our aforementioned results are due to strategic interaction among the states.
This, however, is not what we find. We randomly generated 500 neighborhood definitions,
constructed either directly from random number generators or based on arbitrary features of states’
relative positions in the alphabet. In each case, the predicted response to neighbor benefit changes is still
positive (and usually statistically significant), but nowhere near as large as those found when using state-
to-state migration or geographic proximity and population as the bases for neighborhood definition. For
instance, refer back to columns 1 and 5 of row B in Table 2, where we report that the relationship
between changes in neighbor benefits and changes in own-state benefits, after holding constant state-
specific trends and time-varying covariates, is either 0.714 or 0.437, depending on neighborhood
specification. In contrast, the mean predicted response from these 500 randomly generated neighborhood
definitions is 0.132, and the largest of the 500 predicted responses is less than 0.2. In columns 1 and 5 of
row C in Table 2, we report that the relationship between changes in neighbor benefits and changes in
own-state benefits, after holding constant state-specific trends and time-varying covariates and treating
neighbor benefit changes as endogenous, is either 1.363 or 0.701, depending on neighborhood
specification. In contrast, the mean predicted response from these 500 randomly generated neighborhood
definitions is 0.018, and the largest of the 500 predicted responses is less than 0.25.22
Similarly small effects are observed when we differentiate responses to decreases from responses
to increases to randomly determined neighbors’ benefits. In the case of the instrumental-variables
estimates corresponding to row C of Table 2, in only two iterations is the predicted response to a
neighbor benefit increase significantly different from the predicted response to a neighbor benefit
decrease, and in both of these cases, the predicted response to an increase is larger in magnitude than the
predicted response to a decrease. Models similar to row B of Table 2, but with randomly determined
neighborhoods, are much more likely to find larger responses to neighbor decreases than to neighbor
increases, but these predicted asymmetries average only one-fifth the magnitude of those found when
neighborhood is determined on the basis of proximity and population, or interstate migration, and the
largest asymmetry found in these random neighborhood determinations is less than one-third the
magnitude of those reported in row B of Table 2.
In sum, while we find evidence that is potentially suggestive of our results when we randomly
assign neighbors to states, the predicted responses to neighbor benefit changes are dramatically smaller
in magnitude (and statistical significance) than are those reported in Table 2. Therefore, while a portion
of our results may be due to nonstrategic inaction, we can conclude that it is not the driving force behind
our results. Even though the modal behavior is to not change one’s nominal benefits from year to year,
our results indicate that a state is much more likely to follow suit if its neighbors do not change their
benefits than if some more distant or marginal state does not change its benefits.
An alternative way to determine whether states truly respond more to neighbor decreases than to
increases would be to restrict our analysis to nominal benefit changes. This, of course, would treat a
scenario in which states do not change their nominal benefits as a “no change” rather than a “decrease,”
as above, and so we would be categorizing potential strategic behavior as nonstrategic. In our sample
there are only a few cases of nominal benefit decreases (nominal increases are much more common) and
so we have insufficient observations to estimate the differential response to nominal neighbor decreases23
versus nominal neighbor increases. However, we can at least qualitatively investigate this possibility. We
observe that the mean response to a nominal neighbor decrease is larger than the mean response to a
nominal neighbor benefit increase of similar magnitude. While this result is merely suggestive, it still
provides additional evidence that our findings of asymmetric responses to neighbor benefit changes are
robust.
3. DOES NEIGHBOR SIMILARITY AFFECT THESE RESPONSES?
The preceding discussion suggests that states pay attention to their neighbors when setting their
welfare benefit levels. Our finding that states apparently respond more to decreases in neighbor benefits
than to increases suggests that state policymakers might set benefit levels to reduce the likelihood of
welfare-induced in-migration. Might state policymakers care more about potential in-migration from
some neighbors than from others?
To investigate this question, we repeat our analysis, but this time allow state responses to vary
with the population composition of the neighbor states that change their benefit levels. Proposition 3
from our theoretical model suggests that the more costly potential migrants from neighbor states are to
the state making the policy decision, the larger the asymmetry between responses to increases versus
decreases in neighbor welfare benefits. One possible measure of cost differences may be population
dissimilarity. We choose minority composition as the basis for illustrating this point. Surely, many other
possible candidates for measuring population differences across states could be selected, but minority
composition seems as good as any other and has been used by other authors (e.g., Case, Rosen, and
Hines, 1993) to define neighborhood in other studies. 
We model this potential nonlinearity in benefit responses by including in our estimation two











We have also estimated models in which states weight neighbors by absolute minority share and find that
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states generally tend to respond more to high-minority neighbors than to low-minority neighbors. In other models
where we distinguish responses to black population shares from responses to Hispanic population shares, we find
that states appear to respond more to high neighbor Hispanic concentrations than to high neighbor black
concentrations.
benefit changes, we also include neighbor benefit changes weighted both by proximity or migration and
also by relative minority composition. The weights for computing this second variable are calculated as
follows:
in the proximity-based weighting scheme, and
in the migration-based weighting scheme, where m is the absolute value of the difference in the j
percentages of the population in states i and j that is black or Hispanic (all other notation is as before). In
these weighting schemes, states respond to differences in relative differences in (across a state’s set of
neighbors) minority shares, rather than absolute levels of neighbor minority shares.  We report the
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results of the OLS specifications of this exercise in Table 3, because OLS tends to give the most modest
results of the three principal alternative types of specification used previously.
The first two rows of Table 3 present the estimated difference in a state’s response to a decrease
versus an increase in a hypothetical neighbor’s benefit levels in two situations. In the first case, the
neighbor has a relatively (in comparison to the other neighbors) low difference from state i in the share
of minorities (75 percent of the neighbor mean difference) in its population. In this situation, the models
suggest that a state will decrease its benefits by 41 or 76 cents more when its neighbor decreases its
benefits than it will increase its benefits when its neighbor increases its benefits, depending on25
TABLE 3
Estimated Differences in State Responses to Changes in Neighbor Welfare Benefits:
Differences Based on Minority Population in Neighboring States
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: Change in State’s Welfare Benefit for Family of Three
(532 observations)
Neighbor Definition: Neighbor Definition:
Migration-Based Measure Proximity-Based Measure
(1) Estimated difference in response  0.757  0.410
to decrease vs. increase in benefit of (p=0.011) (p=0.000)
neighbor with 75% of the average
neighbor difference in minority
share
(2) Estimated difference in response  1.296  0.810
to decrease vs. increase in benefit of (p=0.000) (p=0.000)
neighbor with 125% of the average
neighbor difference in minority
share
(3) p-value of difference due to 0.062 0.092
differences in minority shares of
neighbor states
(4) Difference between (2) and (1) if 0.471 0.210
responding state’s minority percentage
is 1 standard deviation below the mean 
(5) Difference between (2) and (1) if 0.406 0.197
responding state’s minority percentage
is 1 standard deviation above the mean 
(6) p-value of importance of own-state 0.096 0.664
minority percentage in determining the
degree of apparent race-based response
to neighbors
Note: Covariates and instruments are as described in the text.26
specification. In the second case, the neighbor has a relatively high difference from state i in the share of
minorities (125 percent of the neighbor mean) in its population. In this situation, the results suggest that a
state will decrease its benefits by $1.30 or 81 cents more, depending on specification (both are
statistically significant at any conventional level), when its neighbor decreases its benefits than it will
increase its benefits when its neighbor increases its benefits. The relationship between minority
population share and differential responses to neighbor benefits is statistically significant at about the 6
percent or 9 percent level (row 3 of Table 3), depending on the basis of neighborhood definition. We
therefore find evidence suggesting that states may respond more to changes in the benefit levels of states
with relatively large minority populations, which is supportive of our finding from Proposition 3.
However, this evidence is not as strong as our general findings of differential responses to changes in
neighbor benefits.
Our model suggests that states respond more to neighbors with larger differences in minority
percentage from their own. But we might expect that this differential response would be higher if the
state making the comparison has a lower minority population than if it has a relatively high minority
population. To investigate this possibility, we further interact our minority-based weighted neighbor
benefit measure with the proportion of a state’s current welfare recipients who are black or Hispanic.
Row 4 of Table 3 reports the difference between the values that would be reported in the first two rows
of Table 3 if the state’s percentage of minority recipients were one standard deviation below the national
mean. Row 5 of Table 3 reports the difference between the values that would be reported in the first two
rows of Table 3 if the state’s percentage of minority recipients were one standard deviation above the
national mean. We observe that states apparently respond less to neighbor minority differences if they
have a higher minority welfare recipient population (although this result is only statistically significant in
the case of the migration-based neighbor definition). Therefore, these results provide additional27
suggestive evidence that differences in neighbor population composition affect state welfare benefit-
setting policies.
4. DISCUSSION
Do states play welfare games? We present a theoretical argument for why states would respond
asymmetrically to increases versus decreases in their neighbors’ benefits, and we find substantial
empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case. States apparently set their welfare benefits to a
considerable degree with their neighbors in mind. This result is robust to model specification, and while
the results do not imply that states are engaging in a “race to the bottom,” they do suggest that states are
more concerned about being “left ahead” in welfare benefit levels than they are about being “left
behind.” Just as other researchers have found that states formulate their tax and expenditure policies
interdependently (Besley and Case, 1995; Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993), we provide evidence that states
also set their social welfare policies interdependently. We note, too, that our insight that states might
respond asymmetrically to their neighbors’ policy changes may be generalizable to other types of
policies, such as tax rate-setting.
Moreover, it is likely that our results understate the degree to which states may set benefit levels
with each other in mind in a new policy regime with even greater state autonomy in benefit-setting. If
states were engaged in a strategic trend toward lower welfare benefits before 1996, it is possible that this
trend will accelerate under the current system.
Surely, our approach is not perfect. We can only speculate as to which states are really neighbors
to one another, and we certainly have introduced measurement error into our neighbor weighting
schemes. However, if we are assigning weight to states to which a state really does not assign weight, we
probably are understating the effects of neighbors’ welfare benefit-setting policies rather than28
overstating these effects. It is possible that we have omitted an important variable that, holding constant
the variables included in our regressions, affects the benefit-setting policies of all states in a
“neighborhood.” But it is difficult to conceive of such a variable that only drives mutual decreases in
benefits, but is not present in times when benefits increase.29
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
In the analysis to follow, note that if ￿* is a best reply to (￿*)  it then follows that ij j ￿ i
(A.1) W￿(b + ￿*) = R* + (b + ￿*)(￿ + ￿  µ ) + C ￿ (R*)(￿ + ￿  µ ); where  ii i i i i i j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j
r
R* = R +￿￿* + ￿  µ( ￿*-  ￿*). ii i ij ￿ ii j i j
This formula merely states that the marginal return from benefits equals its marginal cost, where costs
include both expenditure costs and indirect recipient costs.
LEMMA A.1: A positive shock to J￿N causes the equilibrium benefits to increase and the
equilibrium recipient set to decrease for each state i￿J.
PROOF: Let (￿ )  denote the equilibrium profile of benefit modifications after a positive shock to ii ￿ N
+
J ￿ N. Pick i￿J such that ￿ ￿￿  for all j￿J. Suppose ￿ ￿0. As ￿*>0 for all j￿J, it follows that  ij i j
++ +
(A.2) R  = R + ￿￿  + ￿  µ( ￿ - ￿ ) < R . ii i ij ￿ ii j i j i
++ + +
Therefore,
W￿(b + ￿ ) ￿ W￿(b) = R + b (￿ + ￿  µ ) + C ￿ (R)(￿ + ￿  µ)   ii i ii i ii j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j
+r
> R  + (b + ￿ )(￿ + ￿  µ ) + C ￿ (R )(￿ + ￿  µ) . ii i i j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j
++ r +
The first inequality follows from concavity of W, the equality follows from the fact that the i
system was in equilibrium prior to the shock on J, and the final inequality follows from convexity of Ci
r
and (A.2). It follows that ￿  is not a best reply to (￿ )  , a contradiction. We conclude that ￿ >0 for all ij j ￿ ii
++ +
i ￿ J.
Suppose there exists i￿J such that R =R + ￿￿  + ￿  µ( ￿ - ￿ ) ￿ R. As we have already iii i j ￿ ii j i j i
++ + +
established that ￿ >0 for all i￿J, it follows that i
+
W￿(b + ￿ ) < W￿(b) = R + b (￿ + ￿  µ ) + C ￿ (R)(￿ + ￿  µ)   ii i ii i ii j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j
+r
￿  R  + (b + ￿ )(￿ + ￿  µ ) + C ￿ (R )(￿ + ￿  µ) . ii i i j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j
++ r +
The first inequality follows from concavity of W, the equality follows from the fact that the i
system was in equilibrium prior to the shock on J, and the final inequality follows from convexity of Ci
r
and the supposition that R ￿R . It follows that ￿  is not a best reply to (￿ )  , a contradiction. We ii i j j ￿ i
++ +
conclude that R  < R for all i￿J. ￿ ii
+
LEMMA A.2: If (￿ )  is the equilibrium profile of benefit modifications after a positive shock ii ￿ N
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to J￿N, then W￿(b - ￿ ) < = >R* + (b - ￿ )(µ  + ￿  µ ) + C ￿(R*)(µ  + ￿  µ ) for each i￿J; ii i i i i i i j ￿ ii j i i i i j ￿ ii j
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where R* = R - µ ￿  - ￿  µ( ￿  - ￿ ), depending on whether or not [W￿(b) - C ￿(R)(µ  + ￿ ii i i i j ￿ ii j i j i i i i i i j ￿ i
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PROOF: First note that Lemma A.1 implies ￿ >0 and R <R for all i￿J; where R  = R + ￿￿  + ii i i i i i
++ + +
￿  µ ( ￿ - ￿ ). It follows that R* = R - ￿￿  - ￿  µ( ￿ - ￿ )>R for each i￿J. Since zero benefit j￿ii j i j i i i i j ￿ ii j i j i
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modification was the equilibrium prior to the positive shock to J and (￿ )  is the equilibrium after the ii ￿ N
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positive shock, applying equation (A.1) to both equilibria and subtracting yields
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PROOF of Proposition 1: If the stated quadratic conditions are satisfied, equality holds in
Lemma A.2 and symmetry in equilibrium response follows from (A.1). If the stated quadratic conditions
are not satisfied for some j￿N, then there exists some initial endowment of recipients (R)  and initial ii ￿ N
equilibrium benefits (b)  for which net welfare of state i is not quadratic in ￿ local to ￿=0. ii ￿ N ii
Consequently, there exists an equilibrium (￿ )  resulting from a positive shock to J for which [W￿(b) - ii ￿ N ii
+
C ￿ (R)(µ  + ￿  µ )] - [W￿(b - ￿ ) - C ￿(R*)(µ  + ￿  µ )] ￿ [W￿(b + ￿ ) - C ￿(R )(µ  + ￿  µ )] - ii i i j ￿ ii j i i i i i i i j ￿ ii j i i i i i i i j ￿ ii j
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[W￿(bi) - C ￿(R)(µ  + ￿  µ )]. That (-￿ )  cannot be an equilibrium resulting from a symmetric ii i i i j ￿ ii j ii ￿ N
r+
negative shock to J is a direct consequence of Lemma 2 and (A.1). ￿ 
PROOF of Proposition 2: Let (￿ )  and (-￿ )  denote the equilibria of the symmetric ii ￿ Ni i ￿ N
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positive and negative shocks respectively. Lemma A.1 implies ￿ >0 for all i￿J. Pick i￿J such that  i
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But Lemma A.2 and the concavity assumptions imposed on net welfare imply R* + (b - ￿ )(￿ + ￿ µ) ii i i j ￿ ii j
+
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that -￿  cannot be a best reply to (-￿ )  , a contradiction. We conclude ￿  > ￿  for all i￿J as claimed. ￿ ij j ￿ ii i
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PROOF of Proposition 3: Our proof is analogous to that of Lemma A.1. We begin by noting
that in the presence of state-specific migration costs, the first-order conditions for ￿* to be a best reply to i
(￿*)  can be stated as follows: jj ￿ i
(A.5) W￿(b + ￿*) = R* + (b + ￿*)(￿ + ￿ µ ) + C ￿(R*)(￿ + ￿ µ ) + ￿ C ￿(µ (￿* - ￿*))µ ; ii i i i i i j ￿ ii j i i i j ￿ ii j j ￿ ii j i j i j i j
rm
where R* = R + ￿￿* + ￿ µ( ￿* - ￿*). ii i ij ￿ ii j i j
Let (-￿ )  denote the equilibrium following the given negative shock to J￿N and let (-￿*)  denote the jj ￿ N jj ￿ N
-
equilibrium that results for the given negative shock if the state-specific marginal migration costs
imposed on some state i￿J are increased for the states in J. Find k￿N such that ￿ * - ￿ ￿ ￿* - ￿  for all kk jj
--
j ￿ N. Suppose that ￿ *￿￿  , implying that kk
-
(A.6)  R * = R  - ￿￿* - ￿ µ( ￿* - ￿*) ￿ R -  ￿￿ - ￿ µ( ￿ - ￿ ) = R .  kk k k j ￿ kk j k j k kk j ￿ kk j k j k
-- - -
Appealing to the concavity of W  and the convexity of both C  and C , we conclude that kk k j
rm
(A.7) W ￿(b  - ￿ *)  ￿ R * + (b  - ￿ *)(￿  + ￿ µ ) + C ￿(R *)(￿  + ￿ µ)   kk k k k k k j ￿ kk j k k k j ￿ kk j
r
+ ￿ C ￿(µ (￿ * - ￿*))µ  . j￿kk j k j k j k j
m
If (A.7) is a strict inequality, there is an immediate contradiction of ￿ * being a best reply to (￿*)  . If kj j ￿ k
(A.7) is an equality, it follows that ￿ * = ￿  and thus there must exist at least one j￿N for which ￿*>￿ kk jj
- -
(due to the change in state i’s marginal migration costs, there must be a change in at least one state’s
behavior). This, however, implies that R *>R , which in turn implies that (A.7) could not have been an kk
-
equality after all. We conclude that ￿*>￿  for all j￿N, and this is particularly true of state i that jj
-
experienced the increased marginal moving costs. ￿3233
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